



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI · NUMBER 24

## Democracy in Africa: The Gold Coast

by Edith Dobie

The people of the Gold Coast made history in February 1951 by choosing the men who were to form the first predominantly African government in any British African dependency. This new government includes a Legislative Assembly of 84 members (75 elected) and provides an approach to responsible or cabinet government through an Executive Council. Eight of the Council's eleven members, although drawn from the legislature and responsible to it, are also heads of departments and, as such, accountable to the governor; the other three, ex officio members of the legislature, are in charge of defense and external affairs, justice, and finance respectively. This measure of self-government represents a victory for African nationalism, furnishes the means for more effective implementation of modern British colonial policy, and may prove a test of the strength and flexibility of the British Commonwealth.

African nationalism has as its immediate aim the improvement of living conditions, but the means proposed is to put political power into the hands of the people. In the Gold Coast national feeling spread slowly until after World War II. The young Africans who

served in the army or worked at the seaports or airfields expected a better way of life once victory had been won. Instead, in 1945 and 1946 they found consumer goods in short supply with prices soaring, housing inadequate, and development and welfare programs lagging. The resulting discontent was mobilized in the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), founded in August 1947 by Dr. J. B. Danquah, a distinguished lawyer.

This organization was given new life when late in December 1947 Kwame Nkrumah, who had been educated at Lincoln University in the United States, became its general secretary. Nkrumah exploited every dissatisfaction, yet made nationalism dynamic by talking in terms of the dignity of man. When the general unrest which the UGCC was fomenting culminated in rioting, resistance to the police and destruction of property, the British government sent out a commission to inquire into the disturbances. At its suggestion an all-African Committee, headed by Mr. Justice Coussey of the Gold Coast Supreme Court, formulated most of the provisions of the 1951 constitution.

Meanwhile Nkrumah broke with the

ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

SEPTEMBER 1, 1952

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
22 EAST 38TH STREET · NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UGCC, organized the Convention People's party (CPP), and set about creating and guiding public opinion. Advocating "Self-government now" in place of Dr. Danquah's "Self-government in the shortest possible time," he urged aggressive resistance to the colonial authorities by strikes, boycotts and noncooperation. An attempt to take such "positive action" led to his arrest and imprisonment early in 1950.

During the elections for the Legislative Assembly, although Nkrumah was still in prison and had denounced the new constitution as bogus self-government, the CPP under the deputy leader conducted a rousing campaign, which included mass meetings, processions, songs and placards. So pronounced was its victory (CPP elected 36 of the 84 members and claimed support of 12 more) that it was given six seats on the Executive Council. One of these with the title of leader of government business (changed in March 1952 to prime minister) went to Nkrumah, just released from prison by the governor.

### Government's Success

Nkrumah and his colleagues began at once to implement their nationalist program. Although they were young and without previous government experience, they have achieved notable success. It must be remembered, however, that they owe much to a wise and sympathetic governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, to the three efficient and cooperative ex officio ministers and to the tactful and experienced European or "expa-

triate" civil servants appointed as permanent secretaries—one for each minister.

Among the achievements of this government are the inauguration of universal free primary education; the beginning of a campaign to win over the farmers to a "New Deal for Cocoa" whereby, through voluntarily cutting out diseased trees, the colony's chief source of wealth can be saved; and a new system of local government. Under this system one-third of the members of the various councils—local, urban and district—will be appointed or elected by traditional authorities, i.e., chiefs and councillors, and the rest by voters over 21 having the requisite qualifications. In this way it is hoped (1) to keep alive the influence of the chieftainship, which, interrelated with other native institutions, furnishes the basis and continuity of Gold Coast society, and (2) to teach the rank and file, through actual participation in political affairs, methods of controlling their central government.

These policies of the Nkrumah government exemplify as well the new principles by which Britain is endeavoring to promote the welfare of its colonies. In place of the long-established theory of noninterference by government in the economic and social life of the dependencies, the colonial authorities now assume that government must be the chief agency for social progress and sound economy.

The Gold Coast experiment in government may also prove significant for Commonwealth and inter-

national affairs. When the secretary of state for Commonwealth affairs stated that this colony and others (the West Indies, for example) would in due course be admitted to the British Commonwealth, Dr. Daniel S. Malan, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, protested vigorously. Asserting that all members of the Commonwealth should have been consulted before any promises were made to the Gold Coast, he went on to accuse Britain of acting on its own in admitting India, Pakistan and Ceylon, although these three countries had entered the Commonwealth with the consent of all members.

In demanding that the rapidly rising tide of African nationalism be checked, Dr. Malan is leaving out of account three stubborn facts. The United Nations already has many nonwhite states, and others will ultimately be admitted to membership. A majority of the world's people are of non-European extraction. And African nationalism is but a part of a world-wide revolt against the dominance of the West.

If Dr. Malan should actively oppose Britain's plans for working with African nationalism, the struggle of Africans to be free might well be transformed with the aid of the color-conscious people of Asia into a world struggle between whites and nonwhites. Such a possibility, however remote it may now seem, warrants serious consideration of the experiment now under way in the Gold Coast—an experiment which on Britain's part is both a test of the unity

(Continued on page 8)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: SPRUILLE BRADEN • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. BROOKS EMENY, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

*Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*





## Foreign Policy Divides Britain

LONDON—Ratification of the Bonn accord by the House of Commons on August 1 by the close vote of 293 to 253 has been dramatically described as the end of Britain's bipartisan foreign policy which had endured for 12 years, since the outbreak of World War II. Actually signs of erosion in bipartisanship had appeared in 1951, when Winston Churchill, then leader of the Opposition, sharply criticized the Labor government about its handling of explosive issues in Iran and Egypt.

While points of conflict may be sharpened before October 14 when Parliament, which recessed immediately after ratification of the Bonn accord, is to reconvene, the differences at present between Conservatives and Laborites appear to turn on matters of emphasis rather than on fundamentals. Most of the Laborites are no more sanguine about negotiations with Moscow than the Conservatives. Most of the Conservatives are no more enthusiastic about the rearmament of Western Germany than the Laborites. It was the Attlee government which undertook, in the first instance, to negotiate the Bonn accord, as Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden dryly reminded the Labor leaders. This original acquiescence in German rearmament made it difficult for Mr. Attlee, and even more for former Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, to lead a wholehearted attack on the final fruition of their own endeavors. The ambivalent position of the Labor leaders played into the hands of Laborite Aneurin Bevan, who, having broken with his party on rearmament, is in a position to needle his fellow members on the

Opposition benches as well as the Conservatives.

The Labor party, after intense heart-searching, decided not to oppose ratification but to ask for its postponement until the autumn, when France and Germany would have had an opportunity to make their position clear. The Laborites are deeply reluctant to have Britain take the lead, along with the United States, in rushing the rearmament of Germany at a time when the German Social Democrats make no secret of their opposition to the Bonn accord. The German people, the Laborites contend, should have an opportunity to decide the rearmament issue for themselves, in a democratic way, and not be high-pressured by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and by the Western powers.

### Fear of Germany

Underlying the Laborites' desire for postponement of German rearmament—a desire which is shared by political groups of varied views in France—is a persistent fear of what the Germans may do once they are armed. The Laborites wonder how far the United States will go in re-equipping German industry and restoring to positions of influence those elements which helped Hitler's rise to power. Nor have the Laborites—or, for that matter, the Conservatives—been reassured by references during the Republican convention in Chicago to the desirability of “liberating” Eastern Europe from Soviet control. Laborites and Conservatives agree in opposing Moscow's dictatorship and in hoping for the eventual withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. within its borders. But they are together

in fearing the possibility that the Germans, once armed, may induce the United States to embark on a campaign to “liberate” the territories they lost to Poland and Russia in 1945. And much as the two parties may differ on other matters, they are both determined not to let Britain be drawn into a preventable war.

But what, if Germany is not re-armed, while the victims of Nazi destruction are urged to increase their armaments to ward off the threat of Russian aggression? Here emerges another dilemma, which Mr. Eden brought out into the open during the Commons debate on the Bonn accord. For if Western Germany, which has staged an impressive recovery and is now free of Allied restrictions on steel production, does not have to rearm, then it will offer a formidable economic challenge to British industry, which is striving to meet the double needs of rearmament and exports.

The painful paradox is that German rearmament, perilous as it may seem for the future of Europe, offers a safeguard against Germany's re-emergence as one of Britain's leading competitors for world markets. This paradox, again, is of service to Mr. Bevan, who, in opposing both Britain's current rearmament pace and the rearmament of Germany, appears to his followers more consistent than the official Labor leadership. It is not expected that Mr. Bevan, who is heartily disliked by many Labor party members, will try to break up the party on the issue of Germany or on any other issue now on the horizon. But the increasing support he receives from trade unions which

*(Continued on page 7)*



## Scandinavian Balance Sheet

by Lithgow Osborne

Mr. Osborne, president of the American-Scandinavian Foundation, was the first American ambassador to Norway, 1945-47. Son of Thomas Mott Osborne, he is the publisher of the *Auburn Citizen Advertiser* and was formerly Conservation Commissioner in New York State.

**T**WO concepts present themselves almost automatically in connection with any consideration of post-war economic and political trends in Scandinavia: Marshall aid and the North Atlantic pact. However, although both those developments are the most basic and the most publicized, the importance of neither must be overrated if we want to get an unbiased picture of the situation in Scandinavia today.

Participation in the European Recovery Program and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must be thought of as means for the protection and the further development of the Scandinavian way of life in a troubled and uneasy world. This particular way of life has often been characterized as "the middle way" but represents far more than a system of government-controlled capitalism run by Socialists, equalization of wealth and political democracy. It comprises appreciation of individual freedom in every form as an accepted age-old, and hence seldom publicized, matter of course; tolerance and cooperation rather than violent fights between classes, parties, groups and individuals; a pronounced sense of fairness which demands respect for the law as a necessary set of social regulations in the common interest of all rather than as a missile to be used by self-centered special interests; and a general feeling that the greatest possible equalization of the necessary burdens of society in accordance to each individual's ability will work out for the advantage of all. These traditional concepts were long taken for grant-

ed, but the historic developments of the last decades have brought home to almost every Scandinavian citizen a keen feeling of how much these ideals mean to him and hence how much he has to lose.

Scandinavia was still in the throes of the aftermath of World War II when the formulation of the Marshall plan in 1947 offered a much faster way out of the prevalent economic troubles than anybody had hoped for. But before the European Recovery Program could be put into effect, another much greater danger arose. That was when in 1948 a country that the Scandinavians generally regarded as a sort of Central European example of their own brand of democracy, Czechoslovakia, was drawn into the Soviet orbit. The fate of Czechoslovakia was felt as a potential threat to all lesser countries of Europe, and nation-wide discussions began instantly of how to avoid a similar fate.

### Postwar Recovery

Of the three main countries of Scandinavia, Norway had come out of the war with the greatest scars. Before evacuating, the German occupiers had scorched the earth of its two northernmost provinces; other parts of the country lay ravished by warfare; and half of its immense merchant fleet, the fourth largest in the world and the greatest asset of its national economy, was lost. Denmark had suffered much less actual loss. But its resources had been sucked dry by the Germans, who forced the National Bank to extend credits to them equivalent to six

times the prewar national debt. Also, for about four years it had to feed 220,000 refugees from Eastern Germany sent to Denmark as a haven from the approaching Russians. Sweden, having escaped occupation and any material destruction, was of course in a more fortunate position and was able to offer immediate assistance to its three suffering neighbors, Denmark, Norway and Finland. But Sweden's economic well-being was no less dependent on commerce with foreign countries, and it needed raw materials from overseas if it was to make full use of its well-developed industrial capacity.

The needs of the three countries differed, therefore, considerably, and so did the urgency of the steps necessary for their recovery. However, the Scandinavians did not wait for assistance from abroad. They were able and willing to get started on their own.

The Norwegians had the advantage that their king and government were waiting in nearby London to return. And they did not come home empty-handed. Norwegian ships had earned considerable funds in the service of the Allies during the war, and Norwegian economists had their blueprints ready. The Danes were not so fortunate. But when the Germans dissolved the Danish government in 1943, they left the administration apparatus intact, even to the extent that the Danish Treasury was able to finance the underground resistance movement under the Germans' noses. Also, political parties were allowed to go on functioning;

hence the traditional organs of Danish democracy were ready to take over and prevent chaos when the Germans surrendered.

Both nations started out with programs to tighten their belts while pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps. They had already made good headway toward recovery when Marshall aid began. War-ravished Norway got the lion's share, \$380.7 million in grants and conditional aid and \$45 million in loans—a total of \$425.7 million. Denmark received altogether \$266 million, of which \$235 million were in grants and conditional aid and \$31 million were as a loan. Sweden, untouched by actual warfare, needed no grants but obtained a \$20.4 million loan and \$98.5 million in conditional aid, a total of \$118.9 million.

It is hard to put one's finger on exactly what American aid meant in detail to any of these countries because funds from abroad were often amalgamated with sums from domestic sources, but the general effect was to speed up recovery greatly. Without American help, reconstruction would probably have followed similar lines although through a much longer period and under much greater hardship.

As it was, Norwegian Premier Einar Gerhardsen was able to proclaim as early as January 1950 that "reconstruction is almost complete." Northern Norway had been rebuilt and most of its population had returned within five years after the Germans had made most of the area a wasteland. The Norwegian merchant marine is today bigger and more modern than ever, the third largest in the world.

All this was the result of a strict government policy which curtailed civilian consumption while encouraging investment to make up for the reduction, by nearly a fifth, of real capital during the war. Further goals

were increased industrialization and greater agricultural mechanization and self-sufficiency, especially in relation to cereals.

In Denmark, where the export of butter, bacon and eggs was the foundation of the whole national economy, the main task was to restore the export capacity of agriculture to its 1938 level. For this, considerable expansion in livestock and substantial investment in agricultural machinery and new farm building were necessary. These objectives could only be achieved with the help of increased imports of grains, oil cakes and other feedstuff, fertilizers and agricultural machinery. To secure these, Marshall aid grants came in particularly handy, and the goal was largely reached. But even so, a low level of domestic consumption was necessary.

For Sweden, which had not been at war, the problem was essentially one of making adjustments to structural changes in the outside world economy not subject to Swedish control. The country had to import oil and other raw materials and vital machines from overseas to keep up its exports of forest and industrial products and minerals. That trade problem was enhanced by a series of mistakes in policy based on faulty appreciation of the trends of world and United States economy and by extravagance with the gold and foreign exchange reserves built up during the war. A threatening situation was relieved by belated introduction of strict import control in 1947 and by Marshall aid, which financed essential imports of oil and machinery. Two-thirds of Sweden's raw materials have to be imported. Within Sweden high priority was given to the expansion of the country's hydroelectric resources and its iron and steel industries.

For many years the Scandinavian economies have been characterized by a high degree of planning and

government control. In spite of the fact that these countries have retained a basically capitalistic form of economy, such supervision generally has worked without much friction. Freedom from government interference has never been axiomatic in this part of the world, where the government has participated in production for generations. All kinds of government supervision became more pronounced during war and early post-war conditions, and later a strong impetus to long-range planning made itself felt as a result of the necessity of submitting long-range programs to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation as a condition for Marshall aid.

### **Flexible Planned Economy**

The general attitude toward government control in Scandinavia is, Let private enterprise do the job where it works out for the benefit of all, and let the government step in when the going gets tough and where extraordinary circumstances make extraordinary measures necessary. Typical of the undogmatic approach of the Scandinavians to such matters is that the Norwegian Labor government did not hesitate to return the sequestered ships of the merchant marine to their private owners after the war, and that, on the other hand, during a recent nationalization debate in Sweden the cooperatives came out strongly against nationalization.

Government enterprise got a strong boost in Norway right after the war when the government confiscated the German stockholdings in the country's largest industrial concern, Norsk Hydro, which through heavy investment had grown to 44 percent of the total. However, there was no interference with the rights of other foreign or Norwegian stockholders. For similar reasons the government took over 62 percent of the

stock of northern Norway's largest mining enterprise, Sydvaranger, Inc.

With such heavy production responsibilities on its hands the Norwegian government soon went whole hog in economic planning and published a detailed program for the whole community, the so-called "national budget of 1947," which was modified and simplified in later years. The most spectacular feature of the latest Norwegian planning attempt is a ten-year program for the further development of northern Norway, which comprises one-third of the whole country and is as big as Denmark, Holland and Belgium combined but has only 400,000 inhabitants (12 percent of Norway's total) and accounts only for 7.1 percent of the national income and 4.6 percent of the national capital. The plan proposes to allocate 200 million kroner (about \$28 million) for utilization of the region's natural resources in minerals and hydroelectric power for industrial expansion, modernization of the fisheries, and reclamation coupled with large-scale reforestation.

In Sweden planning has been aimed since 1944 at securing full employment, more equitable distribution of the national wealth in order to raise the standard of living even further, greater efficiency in production, and more democracy in economic life. Recently, endeavors have been concentrated on fighting the threat of inflation and reaching equilibrium in foreign trade.

Denmark, even more dependent on foreign trade than either of its neighbors, has had the hardest time trying to adjust itself to the dislocation of world trade. The sudden loss of export markets in Germany has been partly compensated by the opening up of new markets in other countries. However, many of these are insecure, such as the market for cheese in the United States which

Danish exporters ventured into, produced by ECA experts, only to have it subsequently closed by unexpected congressional action. Even worse was Britain's inability to pay prices satisfactory to the Danes. Also, the sterling which the Danes earned in Britain could no longer pay for many of the products Denmark needed, such as animal feed, fertilizer and machinery, payment for which was largely demanded in dollars. Marshall aid took care of this contingency up to 1952, but now a program of severe controls and self-denial has been put

Heavy defense expenditure in Denmark and Norway, consequent upon their NATO membership, and in Sweden, because of the country's exposed and isolated position, is adding substantially to the economic burdens of all three countries.

### Russia and NATO

It was natural that nations situated like the Scandinavians felt threatened by the westward trend of Soviet expansion after World War II. The fact that the Soviet Union offered first a friendship and mutual assistance pact to vanquished Finland and later a nonaggression pact to Norway did not relieve anxiety because Denmark and Finland had had tragic experiences during World War II with the only two nonaggression pacts Scandinavian countries had ever signed. The disappearance of Czechoslovakia behind the Iron Curtain finally and completely convinced the Scandinavians of the Soviet danger. In contrast to Poland, Hungary and the Balkan countries, Czechoslovakia was not looked upon by them as an Eastern European country that found its natural place within the Soviet orbit, but as much a Western and as thoroughly a democratic country as the Scandinavian nations themselves. If the Czechoslovaks could lose their independence overnight, all smaller nations were in the same danger.

For a year the Scandinavians debated what to do. Should they enforce their traditional neutrality by pooling their limited defense forces into a neutral Nordic bloc? Or was neutrality outdated when the nearest line of attack between the two superpowers cut right across Scandinavia, as the bomber flies? Would the only realistic policy be to seek protection from the Western powers with whom Scandinavia had so much in common? For a decidedly Atlantic power like Norway, whose tremendous mer-



Scandinavia

into effect by the government to cope with a deficit in the balance of payments of 500 million kroner (about \$70 million).

In recent years Denmark suffered greatly from the fact that prices for its imports followed the upward trend of the world market while the prices for her exports to Britain were fixed at the 1949 level by an agreement concluded shortly before the devaluation of the pound. However, this situation has improved somewhat since late 1951.



chant marine was busy in foreign waters carrying freight for Western customers and which had been so recently invaded, the latter course seemed the only logical one. The Swedes could not so easily forget their traditional neutrality, which at least seemed to them to have an essential connection with their freedom from invasion for almost 135 years. They had kept their powder dry during World War II and could look more confidently at their own defense establishment as a deterrent to attack than their Danish or Norwegian cousins. Also, they cocked a watchful eye across the Baltic and worried about what might happen to their daughter-nation, Finland, if Sweden signed up with the Western powers. Completely flat and without natural defenses, Denmark seemed to be Europe's most exposed country and saw the greatest risk in being left by itself. The Danes preferred a compromise that would allow a Nordic bloc to be tied somewhat loosely to a Western setup, but they preferred any solution to nothing.

By January 1949, a Danish-Norwegian-Swedish military committee indicated that a joint defense could be established but that aid in arms and supplies from abroad were necessary to give a Scandinavian alliance a fighting chance. Sweden suggested the formation of such an alliance, but when the United States declared that strictly limited American military supplies would go in the first place to signatories of the North Atlantic treaty, Norway preferred to sign up with the Atlantic powers, and so did Denmark.

The die was cast, and a split Scandinavia was a fact. This was a solution which did not satisfy anybody. Whatever their prejudices, a considerable number of Scandinavians agreed that any solution which left the three countries united would be preferable to a split. The debate over

Scandinavian alliance vs. North Atlantic alliance had been very heated and had followed neither national nor party lines. There were adherents of both solutions in each country. Now, not only the parliaments but also public opinion has acquiesced in the decisions of their respective governments, and these have not been strongly questioned since. However, indications are that supporters of the Atlantic pact have been somewhat strengthened in Sweden, and it is likely that the whole orientation of that country will be thoroughly reviewed if there is any fundamental change in the international status of Finland. In Norway a small group of left-wing Laborites protested vociferously that their party was being railroaded into approving adherence to the Atlantic pact, but this scant opposition has quieted down. There is in Norway today a pretty general feeling that the right course was followed and that membership in the Atlantic pact offered the best protection possible under the circumstances. In Denmark the high taxation necessary for streamlining national defense in accordance with the NATO program has caused some discontent among taxpayers who question the wisdom of undermining the country's high standards of social welfare in order to create a defense establishment that may be overrun anyhow. But this feeling has not gone so far as to arouse serious opposition to participation in NATO.

### Decline of Communism

The main feature of domestic politics in all three countries since the war has been a strong trend back to normalcy. Normalcy in Scandinavia is a slow-moving but constant tendency toward social and other reforms with avoidance of major strikes and other intense conflicts. A special illustration of this trend back to normalcy is the decline of Communist

influence in Denmark and Norway since the war. In Norway the Communists' vote was halved in 1949, and their representation in parliament was cut from 11 to 0. In Denmark their representation in the lower house was reduced from 18 in 1945 to 7 in 1950.

The driving force behind normalcy is usually the Social Democratic, or Labor, party, by far the largest political party in each of the countries, even when, as in Denmark at present, it has no direct responsibility for the existing government.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Eric C. Bellquist, "Political and Economic Conditions in the Scandinavian Countries," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May, 1948; Henning Friis, ed., *Scandinavia Between East and West*, (Ithaca and New York, Cornell University Press, 1950); Franklin D. Scott, *The United States and Scandinavia* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950), and "Scandinavia Today," *Headline Series*, No. 85 (New York, Foreign Policy Association, January 1951); *The American-Scandinavian Review*, a quarterly published by the American-Scandinavian Foundation; *American-Swedish Monthly*, published by the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in USA, New York; *Norwegian-American Commerce*, published by the Norwegian-American Chamber of Commerce, New York; *News of Denmark*, bulletin published by the Danish Information Service, New York; *News of Norway*, bulletin published by the Norwegian Information Service, Washington and New York; *News from Sweden*, bulletin published by the American-Swedish News Exchange, New York.

### Dean

(Continued from page 3)

once opposed him presages stormy weather at the Labor party conference in Morecambe in September and possible concessions to the Bevanite point of view.

The inextricable connection between politics and economics which marks Britain's view of Germany is also revealed in current discussions of Africa and the Middle East. Worried by high prices and shortages of raw materials as well as by dim prospects of substantial increases in exports to the United States and the Commonwealth, the British think

more and more about the possibility of developing the natural resources of their remaining colonies; chiefly in Africa.

### Looking Toward Africa

The crises in Egypt and Iran, which are now seen in London as long-term, fundamental readjustments rather than as temporary explosions, make British investors doubtful about the wisdom of investment in countries where the British government cannot exercise political control. The Conservatives have not found it more easy than the Laborites to settle the Anglo-Iranian oil conflict, on which Britain was defeated by the International Court of Justice at The Hague on July 22, or the Suez-Sudan dispute, further complicated by the deposition of King Farouk of Egypt. In East, West and Central Africa, however, Britain still hopes by wise foresight to avoid the setbacks it suffered in Asia and the Middle East.

Now that the Gold Coast, rich in exportable raw materials and favorably endowed with a promising combination of native and British statesmanship, has been launched on the road toward independence, Britain is focusing its attention on a scheme for Central African Federation, which would include Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This

scheme, initiated by the Labor government, has aroused opposition on the part both of African leaders and of spokesmen for the white settlers, who number 200,000 as compared with a native population of 6,300,000.

During vigorous parliamentary debates in July, notably in the House of Lords, the Conservatives contended that the Laborites had failed to persuade the African leaders that they should accept federation and that, in any case, it was difficult to determine African public opinion. The Laborites, for their part, while agreeing that federation would be economically desirable for the development of the resources of the three areas, argued that political reforms which would convince the natives of the white man's good intentions should precede federation; that African public opinion could be determined and should be consulted; and that the government should not "bulldoze" the federation scheme through, in disregard of the Africans.

At stake in this debate about Central African Federation is not only Britain's hope to develop Africa's economic resources but also its desire to demonstrate that the Commonwealth offers a viable multiracial society in which Europeans, Africans and Asians can harmonize their respective interests. Thoughtful Laborites and Conservatives alike see in

a constructive racial policy which would reconcile the aspirations of white settlers and natives a bulwark against the bitter racialism of the Union of South Africa, which might otherwise affect Southern Rhodesia, and a pattern for what might be accomplished in Tunisia, where Paris, meanwhile, is struggling to work out a reform program satisfactory both to Tunisian nationalists and to French *colons*.

Thus Britain, seven years after the end of a war which drained its human and material resources and accelerated the break-up of its empire, is busy rethinking its role in the world economy as well as its foreign policy. It is of direct interest to the United States that Britain should emerge from this stock-taking with a sense of dignity and independence rather than with a feeling of passive and dispirited acquiescence in decisions reached by Washington.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the second of several articles on current trends in Western Europe.)

### Dobie

(Continued from page 2)

of the Commonwealth and an act of faith in democracy as a dynamic influence in the modern world.

(Dr. Dobie, professor of history at the University of Washington, is a specialist on the British Empire. Her book, *The History of the British Empire and Commonwealth, 1783-1949*, will be published this year by Rinehart.)

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

22 East 38th Street

New York 16, New York

### *In the next issue*

A Foreign Policy Forum

Foreign Policy in the Presidential Campaign

John Foster Dulles

Senator John J. Sparkman

Alfred University Reading Room

Alfred

New York